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Solving Natural Syllogisms
Guy Politzer
CNRS – Institut Jean Nicod, Paris
The oldest reasoning task ever studied by psychologists is categorical
syllogisms. One may question whether after a century of investigation there is
still something to be learned about people's deductive competence from
research on syllogistic reasoning. In this chapter this question will receive a
double answer: a negative answer as far as the usual laboratory task is
concerned, as it will be claimed that it has been deeply misused; but also an
affirmative answer in the sense that previous research has ignored the
ecological relevance of syllogisms: this has often been denied but it will be
argued that this stems from a fallacious conception of the epistemological status
of the formal arguments and from a subsequent bias in their instantiation.
Finally, it will be shown that lay people are highly competent and successful in
using syllogisms once a methodological precaution has been taken, which turns
the arguments into natural syllogisms satisfying the demand of ecological
validity.
NATURAL SYLLOGISMS  AND THE STATUS OF FORMAL SYLLOGISMS
Surprisingly, there seems to be little reflexion in the psychological literature on
the nature of the knowledge or competence that is revealed by participants'
performance on the common syllogistic task. With the possible exception of the
"rational analysis" (Anderson, 1990) based on the distinction between a
computational level and an algorithmic level, researchers seem to be little
concerned with the epistemological status of the formal arguments (or of their
instantiations) presented to the participants. To illustrate what is meant,
consider the following joke. Two persons come across a barking dog. One of
them says: "Beware ! This dog is barking". The other one replies: "Never mind,
you know that when a dog is barking, it never bites". Then the first one says:
"OK, I know this, but does the dog know it too?"
Asking participants to solve a formal syllogism amounts to asking them to
access the formal language of the theoretical model and to draw inferences
within this model, that is, to behave like logicians who have formal knowledge
(like the character who knows that the dog does not bite). The treatment of the
formal argument is situated at a level of cognition that differs from that of the
individuals outside the laboratory who (like the dog unaware that it does not
bite) draw a conclusion from the categorical relations that they currently
entertain in working memory. The arguments that reasoners actually process
are less constrained than those used in the laboratory, which are abstractions
that underlie reasoners' actual arguments. Classical syllogisms constitute an
idealisation that goes beyond the arguments observable in daily life, which we
will call natural syllogisms. The latter may differ from the former by a number of
superficial features such as the order of the premises, the place of the
conclusion, their insertion in a dialogue; more important, they differ by the
existence of a premise that contains a relation of category inclusion retrieved
from long term memory (but is absent in their typical enthymematic
realisations). This feature is crucial and will be considered in detail below.
To put it yet otherwise, solving syllogisms of the type used in the
laboratory requires a level of abstraction that it would be necessary for the
individuals to reach in order to formulate the formal argument that they would
have to produce, should they be asked to justify their informal natural argument.
To this extent, the laboratory task is a metacognitive task that tests participants'
awareness of the rules that guide their own inferential production outside the
laboratory.
From the foregoing considerations it follows that, for a century, research
on syllogistic reasoning has been deeply misdirected: instead of considering
natural arguments it has focused on formal artificial arguments that have no
ecological validity. If the laboratory task is of any interest to the investigation of
reasoning, this is only to the extent that it helps reveal the variety of strategies
that people use to solve deductive arguments, the majority of which escape
their knowledge and capabilities. In the present chapter, little reference will be
made to the considerable literature and the main theories that concern the
laboratory task. However, as an aside, it will be shown that one of the main
strategies used by participants to solve the laboratory task is but an application
of the way natural syllogisms are solved. A method of proof that dates back to
Aristotle, called ecthesis,  and a recent logical analysis of syllogisms will be
brought together and shown to yield essentially the same procedure. Then, the
bulk of the chapter will be devoted to showing that the procedure in question is
automatically involved while processing natural syllogisms. This leads one to
the prediction that near perfect performance is to be expected on natural
syllogisms, a prediction that will be shown to be experimentally supported.
ARISTOTLE'S PROOF BY ECTHESIS
Two methods of proof used by Aristotle are well-known. Four "perfect
syllogisms" with a status akin to axioms of the system are first identified
(namely, AAA-1, AII-1, EAE-1, and EIO-1; see the Appendix for the designation
of the syllogisms). The first method is applicable to all the other syllogisms but
two. It consists in turning the syllogism under consideration into a perfect one by
the conversion of one or both premises, or by changing the order of the
premises. The second method, which consists of a reductio ad impossibile, is
applied to the remaining two syllogisms, after which there is no need for another
kind of proof. However, Aristotle described another method, called ecthesis (or
proof by exposition). Here is an example given by Aristotle in the Analytica
Priora (6, 28a) to prove AAI-3 (all M are P;  all M are S  / some S are P; the
reader is reminded that a sentence such as all M are P is formulated as P
belongs to every M): "if both P and S belong to every M, should one of the M,
e.g. N, be taken, both P and S will belong to this, and thus P will belong to some
S" (Barnes edition, 1984, Vol. 1, p. 46), a more common formulation of which
would be "if all M are both P and S, should one of the M, e.g. N, be taken, this
will be both P and S, and thus some S will be P". There have been discussions
among logicians and historians of logic about the logical type of the exposed
entity, N. Some (Lukasiewicz, 1957; Patzig, 1968) have proposed that it is a
category common to the subject and the predicate (or to the subject and the
negated predicate) of a particular sentence. This view has some technical
difficulties and the more recent analyses offered by Lear (1980), Mignucci
(1991), Smiley (1993), Smith (1982) and Thom (1976) concur to considering N
as an individual variable, making ecthesis akin to existential instantiation in
natural deduction. Whichever view is the correct interpretation, the essence of
an ecthetic proof consists in extracting an individual (or a sub-category that can
be treated as a whole) with a double predication and then searching for a triple
predication before dropping the middle term.
We now illustrate this by giving two examples. First, take the valid
syllogism EIO-3: no M is P;  some M is S  / some S are not P. From the second
premise extract one or several individuals that are both M and S; because these
are M, having property P is precluded by the first premise; that is, there are
individuals that are M and S but not P, hence some S are not P.  Second, take
the pair of premises OI-3: some M are not P;  some M are S. Extract again an
individual that is both M and S; but this time the first premise predicates not-P of
some individual M without warrant that this coincides with the extracted
individual, so that no conclusion follows: this example shows that the invalid
syllogisms can also be identified by ecthesis.
THE PROPERTY OF CASE IDENTIFIABILITY
Interestingly, one approach to syllogistic reasoning, namely Stenning and Yule's
(1997) which is both logical and psychological, turns out to capture essentially
the same notion as ecthesis. They show that syllogisms exist and are soluble
owing to one structural property which they call "identification of individual
cases". An individual either possesses or does not possess each of the three
properties that define the categories S, M, and P; this defines eight types of
individuals: S+M+P+, S+M+P-, S+M-P+, S+M-P-, S-M+P+, S-M+P-, S-M-P+, S-
M-P-. When the joint premises of a syllogism warrant the existence of such a
type, the syllogism is valid. To identify the individual case that defines the
conclusion the authors describe two algorithms: one, graphical, which will not
concern us, and the other, sentential, which is relevant to our current purpose.
The premises of the syllogisms are first interpreted in propositional terms,
which gives the following encoding: all = X→Y;  some = X&Y;  no = X→¬Y;
some not = X&¬Y. The algorithm has three parts. The first part aims to identify
a premise that provides the first two terms of the individual description, called
the source premise. It is either a unique existential premise, or the unique
universal premise that has an end-term subject. (Failure to find either indicates
that there is no valid conclusion). At this stage, one of the terms is necessarily
M. The second part aims to complete the description with the second end-term.
To do this, the quality (polarity) of M in the incomplete description is compared
with the quality of M in the non-source premise (which is always a conditional
premise). There are three possibilities: (a) if the qualities match and M is the
subject of the non-source premise, a modus ponens is applied and its
conclusion (which is the predicate of the non-source premise) provides the third
term of the description; (b) if the qualities do not match and M is the predicate of
the non-source premise, a modus tollens is applied whose conclusion (the
subject of the non-source premise) provides the third term of the description; (c)
otherwise there is no conclusion. At this stage, either there is a complete
description of an individual case, or there is no conclusion. The third part of the
algorithm produces the final conclusion by deleting the middle term and
introducing a quantifier (which is existential unless there are two universal
premises and only one of them has an end-term subject).
We illustrate the algorithm with two examples. First, consider again EI-3
(no M is P;  some M is S). It is rewritten as M→¬P;  M&S. The source premise
is the particular premise, which yields M+S+ as the first two terms of the
description. As M+ matches the quality of M in the first premise, modus ponens
applies as M→¬P; M, to yield¬P and then the full description M+S+P-, hence
the conclusion some S are not P. Second, consider AO-2 (all P are M;  some S
are not M). The source premise is the particular premise, which yields S+ M- to
start the description. Because in the first premise M is predicate and positive,
there is a mismatch and modus tollens applies as P → M; ¬M, to yield ¬P and
the full description S+ M- P-, hence the conclusion some S are not P. In both
examples, through this procedure an individual has received a double
predication twice, viz. M+S+ and then M+P- in the first case, S+ M- and then M-
P- in the second case to produce the full description (a triple predication), hence
the conclusion after abstraction of M. In brief, Stenning and Yule's verbal
algorithm turns out to be a general procedure of application of ecthesis to all
syllogisms.
Before turning to natural syllogisms, we will have a quick look at the
laboratory task.
EVIDENCE OF THE ECTHETIC STRATEGY IN THE FORMAL TASK
If, as will be claimed below, ecthesis is the mechanism that reasoners use to
solve natural syllogisms, one can expect to find some trace of it in the formal
task; that is, participants of higher cognitive abilities who have reached some
critical level in their metacognitive development could apply ecthesis
spontaneously. Indeed, the use of ecthesis can be inferred from studies where
care was taken to exploit verbal protocols (for more details see Politzer, 2004).
In the first experimental investigation of syllogistic reasoning (and
possibly also the very first experimental study of reasoning) Störring (1908)
described two strategies, one visual corresponding to the use of diagrams, the
other verbal which he called the process of insertion. This consists of selecting
the end term of one premise and inserting it next to the middle term in the other
premise. Then the conclusion is obtained by extraction from the composite
expression. For example, given the IA-4 pair of premises, some P are M; all M
are S, a participant said "all the M, including some P, are S" which by
abstraction of M yields some P are S. Similarly Ford (1995) described a
"substitution behaviour" which consists of replacing one term in a premise with
another, as when solving an algebraic problem (which collapses Störring's
insertion and abstraction). Keeping the IA-4 pair as an example, the second
premise allows one to give the value of S to M and the value of S can be
substituted for M in the first premise, hence the conclusion. According to Ford
(1995), the premise that provides the replacement term plays the role of a rule
relating membership of class M and property S (more generally, of class C and
property X), while the premise that contains the term to be replaced provides
specific objects whose status with regard to S (generally to C or X) is known. It
is noteworthy that specific objects are considered. The produce a valid
conclusion the process of substitution is guided by two pairs of rules that are
formally equivalent to modus ponens for one pair and modus tollens for the
other.
In sum, these reports concur to emphasise the pivotal role played by the
extraction of a sub-category or an individual from one premise and keeping its
two-term characterisation before inserting it in the other premise, in other words
they describe the ecthetic strategy in their own way.
Given the evidence of the use of the ecthetic strategy in the laboratory
task, one can expect that performance could be enhanced if this strategy could
be primed. Indeed this prediction was supported. Politzer and Mercier (2008)
used singular syllogisms, that is, syllogisms with one premise in which the
classical sentence some X are Y is replaced with the definite singular this X is a
Y or the indefinite singular there is an X that is a Y. There was a fourth condition
using the definite plural these X are Y. As predicted, comparing the some
condition and the this condition (which cumulates singularity and definiteness)
performance increased sharply (globally by about 40%) for almost all syllogisms
tested. Also, the singular conditions yielded higher performance than their plural
counterparts and the same obtained for the definite versus indefinite
comparisons. All this means that by referring to definite (rather than indefinite)
or to singular (rather than plural) elements of a category, one can prime the
exposition strategy among a sizeable proportion of individuals.
Finally, one can find a remarkable insight in Braine's (1998) theoretical
approach. Although he did not develop a theory of syllogistic reasoning proper,
he hypothesised that what characterises good reasoners is the application of a
specific strategy that he called the choice of a "secondary topic". The secondary
topic is the subset of the subject category of which the middle term can or
cannot be predicated ("the S that are, or are not, M, as determined by the
premise relating S and M"). This clearly delivers a doubly predicated subset.
Then the conclusion follows by application of a modus ponens or a modus
tollens. One of Braine's examples is the AA-3 pair, all M  P; all  M  S. Once the
secondary topic the S that are M has been found, it follows from the first
premise, and by application of the generalised modus ponens of his predicate-
mental logic (generalising these S are M; if something is an M, it is a P;
therefore these S are P) that some S are P. In brief, one can interpret Braine's
view by saying that good reasoners are those who can execute an ecthetic
strategy.
A FIRST STEP TOWARD NATURALISING THE FORMAL TASK: USING
KNOWLEDGE-BASED CATEGORISATION
If, in order to prime ecthesis and subsequently solve the syllogism, it is crucial
that a double predication should occur, then one can think of taking advantage
of one of the most important features of categorisation, namely the possibility
for an entity to be referred to by the name of a category (the hyperonym) or by
the name of a subcategory (the hyponym). In that case the double
characterisation will be realised automatically. Now, consider a quantified
sentence F that relates the category rose with some other object category (e.g.
fragrant) whether by quantifying the roses that are or are not fragrant, or
quantifying the fragrant objects that are or are not roses. This quantified
relationship in which the subcategory rose is involved may (or may not) entail
another quantified relationship in which the category flower is involved. And
similarly a quantified sentence G can relate the category flower with an object
category such as fragrant and again there may or may not follow another
quantified relationship in which the subcategory rose is involved. The entailed
relationship is the conclusion of the syllogism whose major premise is one of
the quantified sentences F or G, and whose minor premise is the quantified
sentence expressing a very small part of the individual's knowledge about the
inclusion of categories, namely that all roses are flowers. This analysis provides
the rationale for the experiments that will be reported. In an instantiated formal
syllogism of the type commonly used in which the minor premise is an A
sentence, the relationship expressed is always new information given in a
fictitious context (e.g., all the foreigners are vegetarians when one is instructed
to consider different groups of people) whether or not such a context is explicitly
provided. In this sense, the relationship is arbitrary and conventional (as
opposed to knowledge-based). It was hypothesised that for the 16 syllogisms
with an A minor premise (viz., AA-1 to AA-4, EA-1 to EA-4, IA-1 to IA-4, and
OA-1 to OA-4) performance on the formal task would be enhanced if the minor
premise (A) contained a category inclusion relation. This is because the double
predication of an individual by both terms of the sentence is automatically
satisfied: an entity that is a rose is a flower eo ipso. In the first experiment it was
hypothesised that merely naming a category (or a subcategory) would be
sufficient to cue participants to exploiting the category inclusion and prime the
ecthetic process.
Experiment 1
Participants were High School students aged 16 to 18 untutored in logic. They
were presented with booklets containing one problem with a different context on
each page. For this and the next two experiments, there were16 different
contexts. Each context was introduced by just a few words. There was a control
group that received a standard laboratory task and an experimental group that
received a modified task in which no minor premise proper appeared but
instead a single word appeared (a hyperonym or a hyponym). Each pair of
premises (or major premise and single word) was introduced by a few words to
set up the context. Participants had to decide whether or not a conclusion
necessarily followed, and in the affirmative to choose the quantifier and fill in the
blanks (in the SP or the PS order) using the categories underlined. Here is an
example for the AA-3 syllogism:
- control condition:
At an international conference,
all the japanese are jurists
all the japanese are organisers
- experimental condition (one word replaced the minor premise):
At an international conference,
all the japanese are jurists
Asians
In both conditions this was followed by the following multiple choice:
Conclusion:
  all the...................are....................
  some....................are.....................
  some....................are not...............
  no.........................is........................
  there is no conclusion that is necessarily true
The correct answer for the control condition is some organisers are jurists, or
some jurists are organisers, and for the experimental condition some jurists are
Asians or some Asians are jurists; the latter is based on the implicit minor
premise all japanese are Asians cued by the hyperonym Asians.
Results and discussion. Collapsing across the 16 problems, the mean rates of
correct response were 49.4% for the control condition and 63.2% for the
experimental condition. This overall difference can be regarded as modest in
terms of effect size, but there are three problems that gave rise to a ceiling
effect with a success rate above 90% in the control condition; when these are
removed, the rates of correct response were 39.2% and 56.8%, respectively.
This difference was not due to a few problems, but concerns the great majority
of the problems: there was a significant increase for eight problems, a non
significant increase for three problems, no difference for one problem and a non
significant decrease for one problem. This difference was significant (p<.01,
sign test) and we can conclude that the improvement in performance is robust.
In brief, the mere mention of the S term (which in the present example is
a hyperonym, Asian) invites the category inclusion of M (japonese) in S and the
subsequent processing of individuals that are M and S (viewing a japonese as
an Asian). This generalises to the eight problems in the third and fourth figure.
The same obtains when the S term mentioned is a hyponym: this invites the
category inclusion of S in M and the subsequent processing of individuals that
are S and M, which corresponds to the eight problems in the first and second
figures.
It might be objected that the cueing word does not necessarily operate by
suggesting a category inclusion. For example, in the present example
participants could formulate the missing minor premise as some Asians are
japanese, hence an easy syllogism (AII-4) that delivers the appropriate
conclusion. However, a problem by problem examination shows that this is
exceptional and that, if anything, such a formulation renders the problems more
difficult overall. Nevertheless, the next experiment aimed to test that an
inclusion relation between non arbitrary categories explicitly expressed by the
all minor premise would also result in an enhanced performance.
Experiment 2
Participants were second and third year psychology students untutored in logic.
The procedure and materials were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the
addition of a third condition in which the minor premise stated explicitly the
inclusion relation so that, keeping the scenario and the same mood already
used as an example, the pair of premises was:
At an international conference,
all the japanese are jurists
all the japanese are Asians
The results confirmed the observations of the first experiment. Leaving out two
syllogisms with a ceiling effect, the percentage of correct responses was 38.2%
for the control condition, 54.0% and 51.0% for the cued and the explicit
inclusion conditions, respectively. The improvement was significant in both
experimental conditions (sign test, p<.05). Moreover, the effect of the
manipulation was extremely close in the two experimental conditions: the trend
in the change in performance (no increase, non significant increase or
significant increase) was identical on all problems but one and the same obtains
for the rate of correct responses that did not differ significantly except for one
problem. We can conclude that the existence of an inclusion relation between
categories that is stored in long term memory enhances performance, whether
this relation is explicitly or implicitly present in the minor premise (when it is
present, the task remains formally equivalent to a standard instantiated
syllogism).
Even though the manipulation was successful in two experiments run
with different populations, one might imagine alternative explanations for the
gain in performance. A very simple explanation could be based on the most
conspicuous feature of the categories in the minor premise, namely their high
familiarity. Indeed, we have claimed that this is what primes the ecthetic
process when there is an inclusion relation between categories. But it might be
argued that familiarity is sufficient, possibly because familiar categories are less
demanding for working memory than are the arbitrary categories commonly
used. The third experiment aimed to rebutt this objection. If familiarity alone is
enough to facilitate the solution, then one should expect people to experience a
similar facilitation with other syllogisms, especially with the eight valid
syllogisms that have an E minor premise. In addition, the response format was
changed to a three-option format in order to ascertain that the previous results
were not linked to the five-option format.
Experiment 3
Participants were post-graduate students, mostly from Arts and the Social
Sciences, and they were untutored in logic. Like in the second experiment there
were three conditions (control, cued, and explicit) but the 16 pairs already
studied were supplemented with eight other pairs (AE-1 to AE-4 and IE-1 to IE-
4). In addition, the response format was changed as shown in the following
examples (still referring to the AA-3 problem):
- for the control condition:
  there is a conclusion that is necessarily true
.........................jurist(s).........................organiser(s)
........................organiser(s)...................jurist(s)
  there is no conclusion that is necessarily true
- for the two experimental conditions:
  there is a conclusion that is necessarily true
.........................jurist(s)........................Asian(s)
........................Asian(s)........................jurist(s)
  there is no conclusion that is necessarily true
Results. Two important points deserve consideration. First, for the syllogisms
with an A minor premise, the gain in performance was even stronger than it was
in the two previous experiments. The same analysis (that excluded three
problems with a ceiling effect) indicated an increase in performance on all
problems for the cued condition (p<.001) and on all but one (p<.01) for the
explicit inclusion condition. The rate of correct responses was 34.2% for the
control condition and jumped to 48.8% and 54.2% for the cued and the explicit
inclusion conditions, respectively. Second, for the eight problems with an E
minor premise, as predicted no improvement was observed; discarding again
two problems (AE-2 and AE-4) that have a rate of success above 85% in the
control condition, there was in fact a decrease in performance (p<.05 for both
conditions).
Discussion. In this experiment the manipulation which consists in priming
ecthesis resulted in increasing the rate of correct responses by about one half.
This greater facilitation can be attributed to the population or to the different
response format or both. However, the fact that across the three experiments
the average rate of success in the experimental conditions does not exceed
60% suggests that the maximal facilitation has not been attained.
The other result may be more important, for it concerns the essence of
the ecthetic process. It is based on the notion that whereas an inclusion
premise can prime ecthesis, an exclusion premise cannot, and we can now
examine more precisely why. To do so, we will contrast the AA-3 and AE-3
pairs of premises using the following instantiation concerning, say, a grocer's
goods:
AA-3:
major premise: all the apples are red
minor premise: all apples are fruit
AE-3:
major premise: all the apples are red
minor premise: no apple is a pear
Conceiving of an apple as a fruit is automatic and virtually irrepressible due to
our knowledge of categories, so that the conclusion of AA-3 some fruit are red
is compelling. In contrast, conceiving of an apple as a non-pear, however
obvious and trivial this may be, is deeply arbitrary, even more so than
conceiving of an apple as an object of which some property is predicated,
precisely because the number of such properties is relatively limited whereas
the categories or properties which contrast with apple are potentially infinite.
Whereas one is automatically cued to think of an individual known to be a
member of a category X (e.g.an apple) as an instance of its supercategory
(fruit), there is no reason for being automatically cued to think of such an
individual as a non-X (except for reasons specific to the context, or in the
particular case where X and non-X are dichotomous or complementary in the
context). In brief, whereas the inclusion premise primes ecthesis by suggesting
a double pedication for an individual such as being an apple and a fruit, the
exclusion premise does not have this power. This explains the predicted failure
in using common categories to improve performance with the AE and IE pairs of
premises.
So far evidence has been presented which supports the claim that to
prime ecthesis it is crucial that there exist a minor premise (explicit or implicit)
containing a category inclusion relation retrieved from long term memory. It was
mentioned in the first section of this chapter that, in addition, natural syllogisms
are typically inserted in a dialogue and that the order of the sentences that
constitute the argument, incuding the conclusion, may differ from the
textbook/laboratory presentation. We now adduce experimental evidence that
when these requirements are satisfied –that is, when one is dealing with natural
syllogisms-- performance is close to the maximum.
NATURAL SYLLOGISMS: IN DIALOGIC SITUATIONS SHARED
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE OF CATEGORIES PREWIRES ECTHESIS
Participants in the fourth experiment were readers in a public library who either
were University students or already held a degree. The problems were again
framed in various scenarios and presented in booklets. There were two
experimental conditions defined by the materials. One control condition aimed
to present a typical laboratory task. Here is an example, using again the AA-3
pair of premises:
In a park,
all the roses are frozen
all the roses are new species
There were five options to conclude: four options with an A, I, O, or E sentence
(all the new species are frozen, etc.) and a fifth option one cannot logically
conclude, the meaning of which was carefully explained in the instructions.
In the experimental condition the context was introduced by a three-
sentence scenario that presented two characters. The first character asked a
question starting with "is it true that" followed by a sentence that was the
conclusion of the syllogism. Then the second character uttered an answer
starting with "I have seen that" followed by a sentence that was the major
premise of the syllogism. No minor premise was stated: this was assumed to be
background knowledge shared by the two interlocutors (and of course shared
by the participants) so that, pragmatically, the minor premise can be given the
status of an implicated premise. With the AA-3 example, one scenario
introduces Mary and Peter who has just been in the park alone. Then the
dialogue takes place as follows:
Mary asks: "Is it true that in the park some flowers are frozen?"
Peter replies: "I have seen that in the park all the roses are frozen"
Mary can conclude that the answer to her question is:
  it is true   it is false   it is possible
The valid syllogisms appeared twice, once with a correct true answer, and once
with a correct false answer. With the current example, the answer is true. In the
false version Mary's question is "Is it true that in the park no flower is frozen?"
For the invalid syllogisms, the question coincided with the erroneous conclusion
that is the most frequent according to the reasoning literature on syllogisms. In
all the cases, after answering the three-choice question, participants were
asked to justify their choice in their own words.
Results. We apply the same analysis as earlier. The mean percentage of
correct answers on the standard task was 47.4 % after discarding four problems
(AA-1, AA-4, EA-1, EA-4) for which performance was at a ceiling level (above
85%; the rate was 59.9% when these are included). These values are typical of
what is reported for the laboratory task in the literature. In contrast, on the
natural syllogism task, the rate of correct responses for the twelve problems
without ceiling effect jumped to 78.9%. The improvement was general: there
was no change for one problem and an increase for eleven problems (p<.001).
Notice that this time the size of the gain is considerable as the rate of success
passed from less than 50% to close to 80%.
The analysis of the justifications given in the implicit condition is very
informative. For the valid syllogisms, about one half consisted of a
demonstration that could be of two kinds: either the implicit premise was stated
explicitly, or the whole formal syllogism was stated in full (including the implicit
premise now spontaneously made explicit by the participant). This provides
compelling evidence that these participants did solve the natural syllogisms with
comprehension of their logical structure. Slightly less than one half of the
justifications were fully consistent with the answer but not informative enough to
constitute a full demonstration. The remaining justifications were either
inconsistent with the answer or based on empirical considerations (a few
percent in each case).
For the invalid syllogisms the justifications that were compatible with the
answer but underinformative constituted one quarter of the cases (and there
were also a few percent of incorrect justifications). More important, the
justifications that constituted a demonstration that the conclusion was possible
but not necessary amounted to 70% of the total. It is also remarkable that it is
for these pairs that the greatest amelioration took place: the rate of correct
answers shifted from 21%, that is no better than chance, to 85%, that is close to
perfect performance. Of course, one must be cautious in interpreting
participants' performance. In judging that a conclusion offered to them does not
necessarily follow from the premises they are not, strictly speaking, proving that
the syllogism is invalid. But they could do so by using the same type of proof
applied to each of the quantified sentences (A, I, O, E) and show that none of
these necessarily follows. Because the proof is similar in all these cases, there
is reason to assume that participants would produce a similar proof, should they
be required to do so. This is because the putative conclusion that was offered to
them was the most frequent error, so that in all likelihood they could also resist
other putative conclusions that are not so enticing. Considering that the subset
of invalid syllogisms that have an A premise are notoriously difficult, it is worth
examining why participants' performance was improved in all the experiments
reported and more specifically in the last one.
For this purpose we take an IA-1 pair of premises followed by its modal
erroneous conclusion which is a some sentence (marked below with an
asterisk). We compare in turn a standard laboratory problem, its counterpart
with a minor premise that has an explicit category inclusion (of the type used in
Experiments 2 and 3) and then its dialogic presentation as used in Experiment
4.
Consider first the following artificial syllogism:
some flowers (M) are frozen (P)
all the new species (S) are flowers (M)
To appreciate that it is invalid, one must understand that an individual
characterised after the minor premise by S and M (flowers that are new
species) need not be characterised by P (frozen) because this individual comes
from a subset of M that may or may not coincide with the M-individuals referred
to in the major premise. Few reasoners are aware of this. In contrast, given:
some flowers (M) are frozen (P)
all roses (S) are flowers (M)
or even better as in Expt 4:
Mary asks:"Is it true that in the park some roses are frozen?"
Peter replies: "I have seen that in the park some flowers are frozen"
it is apparent from the categorisation stored in long term memory that a rose (S
M) is a particular flower (a member of a subcategory) and as such need not
coincide with any of the members of the flower category that are frozen (M P),
which need not be roses: the non-necessary existence of an individual case is
readily made available. In other words, knowledge of the categorisation which
obliges one to conceive of a rose as a flower also obliges one to conceive of a
flower as possibly a rose or not a rose. This justification was expressed in
various formulations that can be paraphrased by "there are flowers other than
roses so that there may not be frozen roses". Of course, there is some
artificiality in the task used in Experiments 2 and 3 due to the minor premise
which is pragmatically anomalous (even though the instructions warned that
one of the premises would state "an obvious truth"), so that performance was
still far from perfect. But when presented as in Experiment 4, participants not
only process a natural dialogue but, more important, focus on a specific
statement (the conclusion) to evaluate, as they would in their daily life: then they
can exhibit their full grasp of the syllogism.
CONCLUSION
For more that two millenia, since their description by Aristotle until the
nineteenth century, logicians and philosophers used to consider syllogisms as
the yardstick of rationality and human reasoning abilities. Then, after this view
had been abandoned in the wake of the Fregean revolution, surprisingly enough
psychologists took a strong interest in a task based on them, which they called
syllogistic reasoning: it consists of solving instantiated examplars of formal
syllogisms, which amounts to investigating the extent to which people untutored
in logic access the formalisation made by classical logicians of a special set of
deductive arguments. A century of research on this paradigm has yielded little
more than the observation that people resort to various strategies and various
heuristics to solve problems that, with a number of notable exceptions, are too
hard for the majority of reasoners.
In this chapter a subtly, but radically different view on syllogisms is taken.
They are regarded as formal descriptions of the underlying structure of
enthymematic arguments that people spontaneously use in their daily
argumentation. Their essential characteristic is that the implicit premise contains
an inclusion relation between two categories that belong to a hierarchy stored in
long term memory. It has been argued that reasoners' competence in using
these arguments is based on a mechanism that exploits a fondamental property
of formal syllogisms described by Stenning and Yule (1997) as case
identifiability and that this mechanism, which was outlined by Aristotle as a
method of proof called ecthesis, turns out to be built-in and executed by the
category inclusion structure: this is why, contrary to the formal laboratory task,
lay people are surprisingly highly proficient in their spontaneous natural
syllogistic reasoning.
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Appendix
The four classical quantified sentences:
A: all X are Y = universal affirmative
E: no X is Y = universal negative
I: some X are Y = particular affirmative 
O: some X are not Y = particular negative
The four figures (in the traditional logical numbering):
        1   2   3   4
major premise M P P M M P P M
minor premise S M S M M S M S
M is the middle term, P and S the end-terms.
The designation of syllogisms:
In a designation such as, e.g.,  EIO -1 the first three letters indicate the mood,
that is, the first premise (the major premise) is an E sentence, the second
premise (the minor premise) an I sentence and the conclusion an O sentence;
the number indicates the figure.
A example of a formal syllogism (in the AAI-3 mood):
all M are P
all M are S
     ∴ some S are P
This formal syllogism instantiated:
all the roses are frozen
all the roses are new species
     ∴ some new species are frozen
The associated natural syllogism:
all the roses are frozen
{all roses are flowers}
     ∴ some flowers are frozen
